主题Topic：Competitive and Welfare Implications of Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly （寡头市场上交叉持股对竞争和福利影响）
主讲人Speaker：曾辰航，助理教授，山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心
主持人Chair：帅杰，副教授，伟德BETVlCTOR1946
时间Time：2015年11月6日（周五）3:30 pm-5:00 pm
地点Venue：南湖校区 文波楼204
主讲人伟德BETVlCTOR1946 简介：
曾辰航：山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心助理教授，2007年获武汉大学经济学硕士学位，2012年获美国密苏里大学（University of Missouri-Columbia）经济学博士学位；在国际知名学术期刊发表多篇论文，如：Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Annals of Economics and Finance, Pacific Economic Review.
研究方向：产业组织，微观理论。
Chenhang Zeng：Assistant Professor, Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior
Shandong University, Professor Zeng obtained his Master’s degree in Economics from Wuhan University in 2007 and PhD degree in Economics from University of Missouri-Columbia in 2012. His papers have been published in leading internationally journals such as Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Annals of Economics & Finance and Pacific Economic Review.
Research Interests: Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory
内容提要(Abstract)：
Cross-holding refers to a situation where a firm acquires passive ownership in another firm that entitles the acquiring firm a share in the acquired firm's profits only. We characterize conditions under which a Courot oligopolistic firm has incentives to engage cross-holdings in rival firms if none of the other firms does so. We also establish conditions with which total welfare increases as the acquiring firm raises cross-holdings in the acquired firms. These results extend those of Farrel and Shapiro (1990) for the case with one acquiring and one acquired firms.
