主题 Topic：The Limits of Promotion Tournaments: Social Ties among Officials andRegional Economic Performance
时间 Time：11月25号（周五）｜November25, 2016 (Friday), 14:00–15:35
地点 Venue：文波207｜Room207，WENBO
主讲/ Speaker：
梁平汉，中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院教授，博士生导师；西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学经济学博士。近5年来在 Games and Economic Behavior, Journal ofComparative Economics, Review of Development Economics, 《经济研究》，《管理世界》，《经济学》（季刊），《世界经济》 等国内外权威核心学术期刊上独立或第一作者（通讯作者）发表论文十余篇。获教育部高等院校青年教师奖。主持一项国家自然科学基金青年项目和多项校级科研项目，是 《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《中国工业经济》 和 International Journal of IndustrialOrganization，European Journal of Operational Research，China Economic Review 等十多种国际SSCI期刊的匿名审稿专家。
研究领域 / Research Interests
博弈论、实验经济学、政治经济学、发展经济学等
GameTheory, Experimental Economics, Political Economics, Development Economics
摘要/ Abstract:
In the context of politicalpromotion tournament in China, this paper explores whether the social tiesamong officials in the same ranking affect the regional economic performance. Inour model, the officials in the same region are considered as a team, whichcompetes with the peers in other regions. Our model shows that it iswelfare-improving to introduce the inter-team competition since it motivatesthe officials to contribute more efforts. However, as recentexperimental findings indicate, social ties among team members mitigate themotivational role of inter-team competition. Using the 2000-2014 provincialpanel data, we show that when the party secretary and the governor have socialties, e.g., alumni, common birthplace, youth league experience, the provincehas significantly lower investment rate and more severe pollution, corruption,and illegal land sale problems. Further, the stronger the social ties, the worseeconomic performance.
