主题 / Topic：Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategies by Informed Seller
时间 / Time：4月21号（周五）｜April 21 (Friday), 13：30- 14：20
地点 / Venue：文波207｜207，WENBO
主讲 / Speaker
Zhang Jun博士，悉尼科技大学副教授，2004年获得加拿大圭尔夫大学经济学硕士，2010年获得加拿大女王大学经济学博士。主要研究经济学理论、产业组织、管理运筹学等理论。在“Journal of Economic Theory”、“Games and Economic Behavior”、“Economic Journal”等多家国际期刊上发表文章。
研究领域 / Research Interests
经济学理论、产业组织、管理运筹学
Economic Theory, Industrial Organization, Operation Management
摘要 / Abstract
This paper considers the selling problem between a seller (she) and a buyer (he). The buyer's value of the product is uncertain and he relies on the seller to allow him to access further information. Meanwhile, the seller possesses binary unverifiable private information that is correlated to the buyer's value. To sell the product, the seller designs the information disclosure rules through Bayesian persuasion, and pricing strategies by charging a fee for accessing the further information and setting a selling price for buying the product upon learning the further information. Both the information disclosure rules and the pricing strategies can signal the seller's private information. We find that the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion always exists and is unique. In equilibrium, the low type seller adopts no disclosure, charges zero fee, and sets the selling price at the expected value of the product. The high type seller adopts a monotone binary partition disclosure policy with the cutoff just high enough to deter the low type from mimicking, charges zero fee, and sets the selling price at the buyer's expected value of the product conditional on being higher than the cutoff. The signaling concern urges the high type seller to provide more information and charges a higher selling price, which makes him worse off. A regulation on minimal quality can lead to lower social surplus. Finally, when the seller's private information is continuously distributed, similar results hold.
