主题 / Topic：China’s Vehicle Quota System and Consumer Choices of Automobile: A Perspective of Sunk Cost
时间 / Time：4月21号（周五）｜April 21 (Friday), 15：20- 16：10
地点 / Venue：文波207｜207，WENBO
主讲 / Speaker
李汛博士，武汉大学数理经济与数理金融系助理教授。2014年毕业于美国康涅狄格大学，获得经济学博士学位；2010年获得中国政法大学经济学硕士学位，2008年获得武汉大学经济与数理学学士学位。在 Studies in Agricultural Economics，Applied Economics，Appetite，International Journal of Obesity，Pediatric Obesity，Applied Economics Letter，Agribusiness等国际期刊发表文章。
研究领域 / Research Interests
实证产业组织、健康经济学、消费者行为、决策学
Empirical IO; Health Economics; Consumer Behavior; Decision Making
摘要 / Abstract
The effect of the vehicle quota system (VQS) in China such as Beijing’s lottery system and Shanghai’s auction system is under-analyzed. This paper analyzes the effects of VQS on consumer choices of automobile empirically and theoretically. Using a huge data set with more than 60 million observations, our empirical analysis based on the mixed logit model shows that Beijing’s lottery system and Shanghai’s auction system both stimulate consumers to purchase higher-price automobiles. However, different from Beijing, the effect of Shanghai’s auction is dependent with individual income positively. We also propose a theoretical model extending Baliga and Ely (2011) to explain our empirical findings which is compatible for both the lottery and the auction systems. Our theoretical model consistently reveals the sunk cost in the lottery system in Beijing makes consumers prefer automobiles with higher price, while the impact of Shanghai’s auction system is heterogeneous, depending on individual income.
