主题 / Topic：Short Selling and Politically Motivated Negative Information Hoarding: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment
时间 / Time：5月19号（周五）｜May 19 (Monday), 15: 10-16: 40
地点 / Venue：文波208｜208，WENBO
主讲/Speaker
邓小虎博士，澳大利亚塔斯马尼亚大学金融学助理教授，分别于2016年、2010年在美国孟菲斯大学、霍夫斯特拉大学取得金融学博士、金融学硕士学位。主要研究公司金融，资产定价，市场微观结构，因果推论等方向。
研究领域/Research Interests
Corporate Finance, Empirical Asset Pricing, Market Microstructure, Causal Inference
摘要/Abstract
Extant literature documents that managers have an incentive to hoard bad news due to political concerns. In this paper, we test the proposition that short selling has an attenuating effect on the politically motivated suppression of bad news. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese public firms around two highly visible political events - meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Two Sessions (The National People’s Congress Conference and The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) from 2002-2014, and find that political bad news hoarding has been reduced after short selling becomes available. We establish causality by relying on a difference-in-differences approach based on a controlled experiment of short selling regulation changes in China. We also find this attenuating effect is more pronounced in firms with stronger political connection (higher state ownership and larger size) and higher accounting opacity, which further confirms our finding. This study sheds new light on the real effects of short sellers on political impact on capital market.
