主题｜Topic：Why Discrete Price Fragments U.S. Stock Exchanges and Disperses Their Fee Structures
时间｜Time：5月22号（周二）｜May 22th (Tuesday), 3：15 - 6：15PM
地点｜Venue：文澜104｜104，WENLAN
主讲｜Speaker
朝镛，美国路易斯维尔大学经济系终身副教授，研究方向为产业组织理论、行为经济学、反垄断与规制政策。曾在International Economic Review，Management Science，Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics，Economics Letters等期刊发表论文，获得过Microsoft Corporation Research Grant, NET Institute Research Grant等学术奖励。
研究领域｜Research Interests
工业企业，微观经济学理论，行为经济学，反垄断和调控政策
Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics, Antitrust and Regulatory
摘要｜Abstract
Stock exchange operators compete for order flow by setting “make” fees for limit orders and “take” fees for market orders. When traders can quote continuous prices, exchange operators compete on total fee, because traders can choose prices that perfectly neutralize any fee division. The one-cent minimum tick size, however, prevents traders from neutralizing fee division. The non-neutrality of division between make and take fees (i) allows an exchange operator to establish exchanges that differ in fee structure to engage in second-degree price discrimination; and (ii) destroys the Bertrand equilibrium, leads to frequent fee changes, and encourages entries of new exchanges.
