主题｜Topic：An experiment on the efficiency of bargaining over the fruits of joint activity
时间｜Time：9月14号（周五）｜Sep. 14th (Friday), 4：00 - 6：30 PM
地点｜Venue：文波 205教室｜Lecture Room 205，WENBO
主讲｜Speaker
薛莲老师现为武汉大学数理经济与数理金融系助理教授，她经济学博士毕业于英国东安格利亚大学（University of East Anglia），硕士毕业于英国华威大学(University of Warwick)。主要研究行为经济、博弈论等方向。目前已在 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 等国际期刊发表文章。
研究领域｜Research Interests
Behavioral Economics, Game Theory
行为经济学、博弈论
摘要｜Abstract
We use experimental methods to test the effects of joint endowment on coordination success in tacit bargaining games. It has been well established that people use existing focal point to facilitate coordination and the power of such cues declines as payoff becomes increasingly unequal. We conducted an experiment in which two players jointly engaged in an interactive team building activity and together-earned the stakes over which they bargain. In the team building exercise, two players jointly complete a shortest route task in a metaphor of a treasure hunt. After the two treasure hunters complete the journey, they independently decide how to divide their rewards using a tacit bargaining table. We find that when people jointly earn the opportunity of tacit bargaining by putting in efforts together, they are more likely to choose according to relational cues. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between performance in the common activity and cooperative behavior in tacit bargaining.
