主题｜Topic：民营化与公司税均衡关系研究On the Relationship between Privatization and Corporate Taxation Policies
时间｜Time：11月2号（周五）｜Nov. 2nd (Friday), 4：00 - 6：30PM
地点｜Venue：文波楼205教室｜Lecture Room 205，WENBO
主讲｜Speaker
刘懿老师现为湖南大学经济与贸易学院副教授，她博士毕业于南伊利诺伊大学卡本代尔分校（Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC), Carbondale），获得经济学博士学位，研究生毕业于加拿大湖首大学，获得经济学硕士学位。专注于国际经济学、工业组织理论、发展经济学等领域的研究。目前已在China Economic Review，Geographical Research，Economic Geography等期刊发表文章。
研究方向｜Research Interests
产业组织，微观经济学应用，发展经济学
Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics
摘要｜Abstract
基于混合寡头垄断模型，本文通过引入企业最低利润限制条件，展开了关于公司税（或称利润税）对于均衡民营化水平的影响研究。首先，本文发现企业税对国有企业行为能够产生直接影响，同时通过策略性干预间接影响私有企业。其次，本文发现不论最低理论限制条件是否绑定，国有企业的均衡民营化水平随着公司税的增加而增加。与此同时，当最低理论限制无效（有效）时，国有企业的均衡民营化水平与私有企业外资持股水平成反向（正向）变动。因此，本文结论说明最低理论限制在民营化政策研究中具有较为重要的现实意义。
We adopt partial privatization approach formulated by Matsumura (1998) and investigate how the tax rate affects the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly. We introduce minimum profit constraint for the private firm. We find that the profit tax rate directly affects the behavior of the partially privatized firm and affects the behavior of the private firm through strategic interaction. We then investigate the relationship between optimal privatization policy and corporate (profit) tax policy. We show that whether or not the constraint is binding, the optimal degree of privatization increases with corporate tax rate. The optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases) with foreign ownership share in the private firm if the constraint is ineffective (effective). This result suggests that minimum profit constraint can be crucial for the properties of optimal privatization policy. We also show that the optimal corporate tax rate increases with the degree of privatization and decreases with foreign ownership share in the private firm.
