主题｜Topic：Impacts of Clawback Policies on Effort, Earnings Manipulation and Compensation Structures
时间｜Time：12月21号（周五）｜Dec. 21th (Friday), 4：00 - 6：30PM
地点｜Venue：文波楼205室教室｜Lecture Room 205，WENBO
主讲｜Speaker
宋豪漳博士现为暨南大学经济学院金融系讲师，主要研究公司金融理论、公司治理与高管薪酬机制、财务会计等方向。已发表多篇学术论文在 North American Journal of Economics and Finance，International Review of Economics and Finance，merging Markets Finance and Trade，Annals of Economics and Finance，Annals of Financial Economics 等国内外知名期刊上。
研究领域｜Research Interests
公司金融理论、公司治理与高管薪酬机制、财务会计
Corporate Finance Theory, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Mechanism, Financial accounting
摘要｜Abstract
依照现有研究，薪酬追回政策的细节应该是根据公司的特性来精心设计的。本文描述薪酬追回条款对高管工作, 盈余操弄决策的影响；求解薪酬追回条款下广义股票和股票期权的最优高管合同。本研究结果表明，薪酬追回条款对高管工作、盈余操纵的影响将取决于管理者的风险厌恶程度、薪酬结构与和薪酬追回条款细节。然后，本文结果指出在不考虑薪酬追回条款下，固定工资与股权薪酬呈替代作用能够激励高管工作而不引诱盈余操弄行为。然而，考虑到薪酬追回条款下，两者的替代作用不存在; 增加固定工资并减少股票或股票期权薪酬能恢复高管工作诱因并不诱发操纵激励。因此，最优薪酬结构为一个较低凸性的薪酬契约结构。
Researchers suggest that the details of clawback policies should be well designed to cope with firm characteristics. This current paper first characterizes the impacts of clawback policies on managers’effort and earnings manipulation decisions. Then, we address the optimal contracts for a generalized stock and stock option compensation with clawback policies. Our results show that the impacts on earnings manipulation and effort will depend on the manager’s risk aversion degree, compensation structure and clawback policies. We then demonstrate that without clawback policy, the fixed pay and the stock reward are substitutes in rewarding effort without inducing earnings manipulation. However, considering the clawback policy, the substitution effect between the fixed pay and stock reward are no longer vivid. Increasing fixed pay together with a lower level of stock reward or option reward can recover the manager’s effort without inducing manipulation incentive. Thus, the optimal compensation structure is less convex than the compensation structure without clawbacks.
