主题｜Topic：
盈余管理，强制缴款，以及企业年金披露准则；
Earnings Management, Mandatory Contributions, and Pension Disclosure Standards
时间｜Time：12月25号（周二）｜Dec. 25th (Tuesday), 2：00 - 4：00PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼711会议室｜Meeting Room 711，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
覃依依博士将于2019年毕业于香港城市大学商学院经济与金融系，获金融学博士学位。她主要研究公司金融，企业年金，盈余管理等方向。多篇工作论文期刊在审中。
研究领域｜Research Interests
公司金融，企业年金，盈余管理
Corporate Finance, Corporate Pension Plans, Earning Management
摘要｜Abstrac
对于为雇员提供待遇确定型企业年金的公司，若其年金资产的市值低于年金债务的现值，公司需按法律要求对其年金资产支付强制缴款。强制缴款对于公司内部现金流是一个外生性冲击，并将导致显著的公司资本支出减少，融资成本增加，以及股价下跌。本文发现当公司面临强制缴款时，将调高企业年金的预计收益率，以达到虚增利润的目的。本文也发现，当公司受到法规SFAS 132R规管后，将减少该年金盈余管理的行为。SFAS 132R作为新的企业年金披露准则在2003年十二月十五日开始实施。本文同时验证了，当公司面临强制缴款时或受SFAS 132R规管后，管理层对于该年金盈余管理的机会将更加敏感。受规管后的公司若披露较高的预计收益率，将同时在年金资产配置中为股票投资分配更大份额。
For underfunded defined benefit pension plans in which the market value of pension assets is smaller than the present value of future liabilities, firms are required by law to make mandatory contributions. Mandatory contributions represent an exogenous shock to internally generated cash flows and are associated with significant reduce in firms’ capital expenditures, increase in cost of capital, and negative stock market reactions. I find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. I also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Meanwhile managers become more sensitive to exploit such earnings manipulations opportunities when facing mandatory contributions, or in post-SFAS 132R period despite the fact that firms indeed respond to SFAS 132R requirements and set a lower expected rate of returns in general. Moreover, managers shift pension assets toward equity to justify higher expected rate of returns and match the risks and returns after SFAS 132R is in place.
