主题｜Topic：Personalized Pricing with Superior Preference Information and The Role of List Pricing
时间｜Time：9月6号（周五）｜Sep. 6th (Friday), 2:00-4:30 PM
地点｜Venue：文澴楼709会议室｜Meeting Room 709，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
徐子彬博士现为上海交通大学市场营销的助理教授。毕业于南加州大学马歇尔商学院获得商学博士学位。他的论文发表于Marketing Science以及IEEE Transactions Engineering Management。
研究领域｜Research Interests
定价以及信息交流策略，占优偏好信息和消费者隐私，数字平台的管理和定价规制
Pricing and Communication Strategies, Superior Preference Information and Consumer Privacy, Digital Platform Management and Price Regulations
摘要｜Abstract
We examine the implications of superior preference information on first-degree price discrimination. This situation arises when consumers have imperfect knowledge of their reservation values, whereas data aggregation enables the firm to have superior, or more accurate, preference information. We find that list pricing is essential to alleviate consumers’ suspicions of being tricked into overpaying. However, alleviating these suspicions prevents the firm from appropriating the entire consumer surplus, even though it is the most profitable personalized pricing scheme. Our results also suggest that the firm with a stronger informational advantage is not necessarily more profitable. In addition, some consumers may be strictly better off from personalized pricing.
我们考察了占优偏好信息对一级价格歧视的影响。占优偏好信息出现在当消费者对于他们自己的保留价格不完全了解，而企业通过数据归集可以获得更加优质或者更加准确的偏好信息时。我们发现明码标价有利于降低消费者对于自己过度支付的担忧。然而即便在利润最大化的个人定价下，降低这种担忧会阻碍企业获取整个消费者剩余。我们的结果也发现有更强信息优势的企业不一定能够获取更高的利润。此外，有些消费者在个人定价下会更好。
