主题 | Topic：Pricing and observational learning in crowdfunding: the moderate effect of target
时间 | Time：12月24号（周五）｜Dec.24th(Friday), 14：00 –15:30
地点 | Venue：文澴楼414｜Room 414，WENHUAN
主讲 | Speaker
刘晓峰，bv伟德源自英国始于1946工商管理学院营销管理系副教授。主要从事市场营销和行为运作的交叉研究，先后于普渡大学、香港城市大学做访问学者。在 Production and operations management、Decision Science、《管理科学学报》、《中国管理科学》、《管理工程学报》、《管理科学》、《财贸经济》杂志发表多篇学术论文。主持国家自然科学青年基金、国家社科一般项目和教育部人文社科基金等项目。
研究领域| Research Interests
市场营销、行为运作的交叉研究
摘要| Abstract
This paper studies pricing and observational learning in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign context. The creator sets a funding target and uses different pricing strategies in order to make the project successful: menu price and other static or dynamic price strategies, such as low price, high price, and intertemporal price. In a sequential game, the creator needs to choose the optimal pricing strategy with or without information disclosure. With information disclosure, the follower can infer the quality of the product by observing the former’s decision. We found that this observational learning effect is a double-edged sword and is positively moderated by the target when different pricing strategies are adopted: on one hand, it will benefit the creator from intertemporal pricing strategy or high price strategy if the target is very high; on the other hand, it has an adverse effect on the profit if menu price (high price) is adopted when the target is relatively (very) low. In some condition, menu price (high price) without information disclosure will be optimal when the target is relative (very) low.
