主题｜Topic：Information Design, Externalities, and Government Interventions
时间｜Time：09.09（周五）14: 00-15: 30
地点｜Venue：文澴楼教室｜Class Room 215，WENHUAN
主讲｜Speaker
李程现任伟德BETVlCTOR1946教授，曾任美国密西西比州立大学(Mississippi State University)经济学副教授 (终身教职)。研究领域为法与经济学、公共经济学、信息经济学、微观经济理论。研究论文发表在 Social Choice and Welfare、Forest Science、Economics Letters、Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization、Vanderbilt Law Review、Journal of Economic Policy Reform等国际知名期刊。
研究领域｜Research Interests
法与经济学、公共经济学、信息经济学、微观经济理论
摘要｜Abstract
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective tax and subsidy, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.
